Hussein Agha and Robert Malley have joined the ranks of the delay-sayers.
Agha and Malley are among the most astute analysts of the long-stalled Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process. Their essay on what went wrong at the Camp David summit in 2000 sparked intense criticism – most notably from Ehud Barak, who preferred to deny the very possibility of peace than to accept any fault. Since then their once-radical critique has become closer to conventional wisdom, as they demonstrate in a review of three new books by former American diplomats.
Surprisingly, though, Agha and Malley conclude by joining the delay-sayers: the old diplomatic hands advising Barack Obama to avoid a peace initiative at the beginning of his terms:
A more assertive US policy, greater fortitude in the face of Israeli or Palestinian pressure, a focus on the endgame, and sustained Arab and European backing might have made a difference at Camp David. These factors might still have changed the course of events in the months following the summit or perhaps even during the first few years of the Bush administration. [2] But these ideas, ignored when they were ripe, may now be on the verge of being accepted just as they are becoming obsolete. That is because so much of what the peace process relied upon has been transfigured. It was premised on the existence of two reasonably cohesive entities, Israeli and Palestinian, capable of reaching and implementing historic decisions, a situation that, today, is in serious doubt; continued popular faith and interest in a two-state solution, which is waning; significant US credibility, which is hemorrhaging; and a relatively stable regional landscape, which is undergoing seismic shifts.
Much as I respect the writers, and understand their caveats, I believe they are mistaken. Waiting will make matters worse. And in closely watching the negotiating process, they have left out another flaw in the process up to now: There has been no attempt at public diplomacy, aimed at renewing a constituency among both Israelis and Palestinians who see hope in peace efforts.
Interesting enough, while Agha and Malley have joined the delay-sayers, Aaron David Miller appears to have left that camp. In a new column in Newsweek, he takes as his starting point that Obama will pursue peace, and advises him that doing so requires being much more willing than his predecessors to demand changes in Israeli policy:
If Obama is serious about peacemaking he’ll have to adjust [the] balance in two ways. First, whatever the transgressions of the Palestinians (and there are many, including terror, violence and incitement), he’ll also have to deal with Israel’s behavior on the ground. The Gaza crisis is a case in point. Israel has every reason to defend itself against Hamas. But does it make sense for America to support its policy of punishing Hamas by making life unbearable for 1.5 million Gazans by denying aid and economic development? The answer is no.
Then there’s the settlements issue. In 25 years of working on this issue for six secretaries of state, I can’t recall one meeting where we had a serious discussion with an Israeli prime minister about the damage that settlement activity-including land confiscation, bypass roads and housing demolitions-does to the peacemaking process. There is a need to impose some accountability. And this can only come from the president.
Only recently, Miller was making the case for low-level conflict management. Now he’s back in the peacemaking camp – or he has decided that this is where Obama is headed, and that he might as well give relevant advice. Either way, welcome back, Aaron.
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